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REPRESENTATION OF CLIENTS BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: AUTHORIZED OR
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW?
INTRODUCTION
Many courts in a variety of different cases have struggled to
find a definition of what constitutes the practice of law. These strug-
gles generally end with the conclusion that so many different con-
cepts are involved that one definition would be unworkable. Ques-
tions about which activities make up the practice of law most often
occur when someone is charged with the unauthorized practice of
law. Accountants, realtors, and architects are but a few profes-
sionals who, because of the nature of their businesses, have been
caught up in the controversy over precisely what constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law.2 In an attempt to delineate the realm
of the attorney from that of the accountant, the realtor, and the ar-
chitect, formal agreements have been reached between members of
those professions and the American Bar Association (ABA).'
However, even those agreements have not proven wholly satisfac-
tory, and the ABA has recognized that in some instances the in-
1. In each of the following cases the court decided the unauthorized practice
issue after specifically refusing to define the practice of law. E.g., State Bar of Arizona
v. Arizona Land & Title Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1, 8 (1961) (employees of title com-
pany preparing deeds and mortgages constitutes unauthorized practice of law); State
v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962) (non-lawyer licensed to represent clients
before Patent Office engaged in unauthorized practice by doing business in Florida);
Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977, 982 (1937) (layperson appearing before
state public service commission was unauthorized practice); Auerbacher v. Wood, 139
N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800, 801 (1947), affl'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863, 864 (1948) (in-
dustrial relations consultant using legal knowledge as incidental to non-legal service
not practicing law).
2. E.g., Illinois State Bar Ass'n. v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E.2d 773 (1949)
(real estate broker who prepared deeds, mortgages and contracts was guilty of
unauthorized practice); Grace v. Allen, 407 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Cir. App. 1966) (accoun-
tant admitted to practice before Treasury Department guilty of unauthorized practice
in doing legal research); In Re Welch, 123 Vt. 180, 185 A.2d 458 (1962) (surveyor enjoin-
ed from giving advice on legal rights).
3. These agreements are collected in THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES WITH RESPECT TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW FORMULATED BY
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND VARIOUS BUSINESS AND PRO-
FESSIONAL GROUPS (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES]. The
book contains agreements between the ABA and the following ten professional groups:
accountants, architects, banks with trust functions, casualty insurers, claims adjusters,
collection agencies, life insurance companies, publishing houses, and social workers.
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terests of the bar and other professions may be so conflicting that
they are irreconcilable.'
Members of the organized bar are concerned about providing
high standards of competence and adhering to a strict code of pro-
fessional ethics.' Cases concerning unauthorized practice invariably
hold that regulation is not meant to create a monopoly for members
of the bar, but instead to protect the public from being represented
in legal matters by unqualified persons who cannot be disciplined by
the judicial system.' However, it would be naive if not dishonest to
ignore a desire to buttress the authority of the organized bar and to
increase the income of its members.'
4. Forward to ABA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 3. The preamble
to the statement of principles made by the ABA and the Council of Certified Public
Accountants illustrates how difficult it is to separate the practice of law belonging ex-
clusively to attorneys from the accounting business:
In our complex society, the average citizen conducting a business is con-
fronted with a myriad of governmental laws and regulations which cover
every phase of human endeavor and raise intricate and perplexing prob-
lems. These are further complicated by the tax incidents attendant upon
all business transactions. As a result, citizens in increasing numbers have
sought the professional services of lawyers and certified public accoun-
tants .... Frequently the legal and accounting phases are so interrelated
and interdepedent and overlapping that they are difficult to distinguish.
Particularly is this true in the field of income taxation where questions of
law and accounting have sometimes been inextricably intermingled.
ABA STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, at 1.
5. Foward to ABA STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES, supra note 3.
6. The language often repeated in unauthorized practice cases is found in
Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31 (1943):
The justification for excluding from the practice of law persons not admit-
ted to the bar is to be found, not in the protection of the bar from com-
petition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and
represented in legal matters by incompetent ... persons, over whom the
judicial department could exercise little control.
Id. at 180, 52 N.E.2d at 31. Numerous other cases employ similar language. See, e.g.,
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. United Taxpayers of America, 312 Il1. App. 243, 38 N.E.2d 349
(1941); Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942); In Re Shoe Mfrs.
Protective Ass'n, 295 Mass. 369, 3 N.E.2d 746 (1936); Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166,
271 N.W. 282 (1936); Pioneer Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. State Bar of Nevada, 326 P.2d
408 (Nev. 1958); New Jersey State Bar Ass'n v. Northern N.J. Mortgage Associates, 22
N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956); People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919);
Daniel v. Wells, 191 S.C. 468, 5 S.E.2d 181 (1939).
Ironically, even though protection of the public is the stated reason for ex-
cluding unlicensed persons from the practice of law, the above cases all were brought
in the first instance by bar associations and not by members of the public.
7. Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among
Power Groups, 4 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1955). Johnstone concludes that unauthorized
practice cases are a device by lawyers to eliminate lay competition and to restrict the
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Balanced against the interests of members of the bar and the
judiciary are the interests of laypersons in what they believe is
their right to pursue the occupation of their choice unfettered by
concerns over possible unauthorized practice charges." Non-lawyers
often find themselves in a headlong confrontation with the bar over
some aspect of their occupation that impinges upon the law.
Realtors, for example, have been the targets of unauthorized prac-
tice charges because they fill out deed forms as a routine part of
real estate transactions? The courts are split on whether filling out
legal forms constitutes the practice of law.'" Realtors argue that fill-
ing out deeds is a legitimate, although incidental part of their
business, while members of the bar say that even filling out simple
deeds requires legal knowledge and therefore should be done only
by lawyers." Many businesses, in addition to real estate, have been
targets for unauthorized practice charges by members of the
organized bar."
The state of the law regarding laypersons representing clients
in administrative proceedings is even more confusing than the area
of real estate practice. Statutes setting up administrative agencies
sometimes allow representation by non-lawyers, or give the agency
number of lawyers to provide higher incomes for those already licensed. Id. Part of the
reason for this conclusion is that consumers of these legal-type services, the supposed
beneficiaries of unauthorized practice actions, have not been active in bringing these
lawsuits. Id. at 3.
8. This is almost always one of the arguments made by laypersons in
unauthorized practice cases; but the courts refuse to accept the reasoning. For exam-
ple, in one case the court held that the right to practice law is not a right or privilege
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Ginsburg
v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 52 (1958).
9. E.g., Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961). In
Reynolds the court held that filling out legal documents by real estate brokers was a
form of practicing law, but it was not unauthorized. One basis for the holding was lack
of injury to the public from what had become customary practice among realtors. Id.
10. A typical example of this lack of consensus is presented by a comparison
of Reynolds, and State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land & Title Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366
P.2d 1 (1961). The Reynolds court held that filling out legal forms is an acceptable inci-
dent of the real estate business. That decision was severely criticized by the court in
State Bar of Arizona, where preparation of legal documents by title company
employees was held to be unauthorized practice of law.
11. E.g., Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41
Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619, 620 (1952).
12. See J. FISCHER, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (1972). Just a few of
the occupations that have come under fire for practicing law are labor unions, banks
and trust companies, and accounting and collection companies.
19811
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power to decide who may represent clients." Again, no uniformity
exists among states on the issue of laypersons appearing in a
representative capacity before administrative bodies."' Not only is
there a disagreement on that issue, but also on the more fundamen-
tal problem of whether state legislatures have the power to allow
non-lawyers to represent clients before a state administrative
body. 5
Most courts agree they have the inherent power to regulate
matters relating to practice of law and judicial administration." The
extent to which the legislature may enact statutes that affect
judicial regulation of the practice of law varies from state to state."
13. E.g., ARK. STAT. § 81-1323(c) (1960) (claimant in proceeding before
workmen's compensation board may be represented by anyone authorized in writing);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3373(a) (1974) (individual claiming benefits before unemploy-
ment compensation board may be represented by counsel or other agent); FLA. STAT. §
447.609 (1977) (any fulltime employee or officer of public employer or employee
organization may represent an employer or member of bargaining unit in proceedings
before Florida Public Employees Relations Commission); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A, §
37 (1971) (party appearing before unemployment compensation board may be
represented by an attorney or agent); S.C. CODE § 41-39-30 (1976) (person claiming
benefits may be represented by attorney or agent before unemployment compensation
board); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.17 (1971) (party before unemployment compensation com-
mission may be represented by an attorney or other agent).
14. See, e.g., Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 217
Cal. 244, 18 P.2d 341 (1933) (layperson may represent client before industrial accident
commission); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937) (non-
lawyer who appeared before workmen's compensation board held in contempt for
unauthorized practice of law); Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941)
(statutes cannot authorize practice of law by laypersons before state railway commis-
sion); Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936) (assisting workmen or
dependents in presenting workmen's compensation claim is not practice of law); West
Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959) (state compensation com-
missioner was without power to permit non-lawyer to practice).
15. See Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 217 Cal.
244, 18 P.2d 341 (1933) (court held legislature could provide statutory exceptions to
rule against allowing laypersons to practice); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d
977 (1937) (judicial branch has sole power to regulate practice both in and out of court);
In Re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906) (legislature may in certain
circumstances permit practice of law by laypersons); West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144
W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959) (legislative enactment allowing administrative agency
to promulgate rule allowing practice by non-lawyers is void).
16. State Bar Ass'n of Connecticut v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 20 Conn.
Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (1957); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d
914 (1942); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936); In Re Opinion of the
Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); Hunter v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W.
380 (1937).
17. In New York the power to control the practice of law is vested in the
legislature, not in the judiciary. See In Re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). A strict separa-
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With the growth of administrative agencies since the 1930s,'8 cor-
responding numbers of unauthorized practice lawsuits have in-
creased.9
A perfect example of the dilemma in which a lay person en-
gaged in a lawful occupation may find himself occurred in Florida.
Edward P. Moses was the chief contract negotiator for a school
board.' During the course of negotiations, three unfair labor prac-
tice charges were filed against the school board.2' The charges
ultimately resulted in a trial-like proceeding before an examiner for
the Florida Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC).'
Because Moses represented his client in an administrative hearing
that was very similar to a courtroom trial, the Florida Bar sought a
determination from the Florida Supreme Court that Moses' actions
constituted unauthorized practice of law.23 Amicus curiae briefs in
support of Moses' right to represent others were filed by the
Florida Education Association/United, AFL-CIO and by the Florida
Attorney General's office."
At issue in the Moses case, as well as in most other cases deal-
ing with practice before administrative agencies is not just the
unauthorized practice of law, or lack of it. Much more fundamental
rights are at stake, including the right to rely on statutes allowing
representation by lay practitioners 5 and the right to have advance
tion of powers doctrine requiring that the judicial branch have sole power over prac-
tice of law is followed in Missouri. See Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977
(1937). Other states follow the rule that while ultimate control over practice of law
rests with the judiciary, the legislature under its police powers may pass laws in aid of
the judiciary. See In Re Baker, 8.N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); In Re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 P. 1152 (1918).
18. See vom Baur, Representation Before Administrative Agencies, 30
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1297, 1308 (1955).
19. Evidence of this increase can be seen in the tremendous number of
unauthorized practice cases that have arisen since the 1930's and the few reported
cases before that time. See J. FISCHER, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE HANDBOOK (1972).
Perhaps some of this increase in the number of unauthorized practice cases can be at-
tributed to the acknowledged interest of the ABA in the problem. In 1930 the ABA
created its Standing Committee on Unauthorized Practice as part of a growing
awareness of the problem. See FORWARD TO ABA STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3.
20. School Board of Escambia County v. Public Employees Relations Comm'n,
350 So.2d 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
21. Id.
22. Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1980).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. E.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1957 (1972) (individual claiming benefits
may be represented before appeals board by counsel or agent); MICH. Comp. LAWS
1981]
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notice that a particular type of conduct is prohibited. These issues
are not peculiar to Moses. They arise not only in labor law but also
in workmen's compensation 6 and other agency proceedings where
non-lawyers are allowed to practice.
Administrative agencies are an integral part of the government
at both state and federal levels.' But the states and federal govern-
ment differ greatly in their treatment of representation before ad-
ministrative agencies. The federal government is much more liberal
than state governments in allowing laypersons to appear in a
representative capacity."6 According to the federal Administrative
Procedure Act, the matter of who may appear in a representative
capacity is left up to each agency.2' Some federal agencies, such as
ANN. § 421.31 (1977) (any person claiming unemployment compensation before the com-
mission or a court may be represented by counsel or other agent); NEV. REV. STAT. §
463.150(k) (1979) (state gaming commission and Nevada tax commission shall prescribe
qualifications of attorneys, accountants and others, under which they shall be permit-
ted to appear); S.C. CODE § 40-5-80 (1976) (citizen can prosecute or defend another per-
son so long as they do so without reward).
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-298 (1972) (both parties may appear either in
person, by attorney or other accredited representative); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.261
(1966) (upon request by an employer or employee, industrial commission may designate
one of its employees to advise a party of his or her rights); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
282.13(B) (1977) (any individual claiming benefits may be represented by counsel or
agent); N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 24-a (McKinney Supp. 1980) (no person, firm or
corporation other than an attorney shall appear on behalf of claimant unless the person
appearing is a citizen of the United States and shall have obtained from the board a
license).
The most influential case involving appearance before a workmen's compensa-
tion board is West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959). In
that case, the court held that appearance before a workmen's compensation board by a
layperson was unauthorized even though it was permitted by statute. Id.
27. In Public Service Traffic Bureau v. Haworth Marble Co., 400 Ohio App.
255, 178 N.E. 703 (1931), the court explains the development and importance of ad-
ministrative agencies:
We are aware that in recent years the federal and state governments
have devised means for settlement and adjustment of disputes other than
by resort to courts of justice. In carrying out this plan various commis-
sions and boards have been provided for, and established, which perform
these functions, and, generally speaking, practice before these extra-
judicial commissions and boards is not confined to attorneys at law, as the
principal reason for the creation of these bodies was to avoid the
technicalities involved in court procedure.
Id. at 257, 178 N.E. at 705.
28. See vom Baur, Administrative Agencies and Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 48 A.B.A.J. 715, 716-17 (1962).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 555 (b) (1977).
A person compelled to appear in person before an agency or represen-
tative thereof is entitled to be accompanied, represented, and advised by
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https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol15/iss3/4
UNA UTHORIZED PRA CTICE OF LA W
the United States Patent Office, require examinations and specific
educational qualifications before a layperson or an attorney is admit-
ted to the agency's bar."
If the states would follow the lead of the federal government
and allow quasi-judicial administrative agencies to set up their own
bars regulating who may practice, most of the arguments on both
sides of the issue would be satisfied. Courts would be less burdened
by unauthorized practice lawsuits, and non-lawyers would know
where and when they legally could appear to represent a client.
This note will illustrate the breadth of the unauthorized prac-
tice problems with respect to state administrative agencies,
together with a history of the development of the problem. A discus-
sion of theories used by courts to justify regulation of lay practi-
tioners reveals not only a legitimate concern for protection of the
public against unscrupulous persons, 1 but also a usurpation by many
courts of power that properly belongs to state legislatures.2 In-
herent judicial power to regulate practice of law has long been the
umbrella many courts use to justify usurpation of a broad range of
legislative powers. An examination of the inherent power concept
counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative.
A party is entitled to appear in person or by or with counsel or other
duly qualified representative in an agency proceeding.
Id.
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(b)(c) (1980). A person seeking to practice before the
United States Patent Office must establish that he is "of good moral character and of
good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications
necessary to enable him to render applicants for patents valuable service. ... Id.
The Patent Office is just one federal agency that requires even lawyers to
become members of its bar in order to practice. Other such agencies include: In-
terstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communications Commission and the
Treasury Department. For a discussion of the bars of federal administrative agencies,
see vom Baur, Representation Before Administrative Agencies, 30 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1297, 1305 (1955).
31. See note 6 supra.
32. Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of In-
herent Judicial Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 162 (1960). The author of this comment main-
tains that in regulating practice of law the courts have failed to distinguish between
dominent judicial power and dominent legislative power. Id. at 163. The comment
states that judicial power over practice of law should be confined to regulation of those
activities that directly affect the judicial process. Beyond that, the legislature should
be permitted to exercise its traditional police power for protection of the public; where
the need is solely to protect the public, the court should not interfere with legislative
process. Id.
33. It is generally conceded throughout the country that the power to
control admissions to the bar and to discipline members of the bar is in-
herent in the judiciary. . . . But whether inherent or express, these
1981]
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will show that few courts even attempt to justify the all-
encompassing power they claim to have in the area of unauthorized
practice.' However, a look at practice before the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) and the United States Patent Office will
reveal two workable schemes that regulate lay practitioners in the
federal administrative system without undue court intervention.
The NLRB and the Patent Office both allow lay practitioners to ap-
pear before them, the latter upon examination and application, and
the former with no examination. The autonomy of these two federal
agencies will be explored, together with a look at the hands-off ap-
proach taken by lower federal courts and by the United States
Supreme Court."5 An historical analysis of the roots of regulation of
powers over admission and discipline of members of the bar would be
meaningless and futile if laymen might practice law with impunity ...
The power to control admissions and to discipline the members of the bar
necessarily carries with it the power to prevent laymen from practicing
law.
In Re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 334, 85 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1951).
Since an attorney is an officer of the court, the latter possesses the
inherent power to supervise his conduct, to the point of reprimanding or
even removing him from office for misconduct .... It logically follows that
the courts have the inherent power apart from statute, to inquire into the
conduct of any person-whether an individual, a lay agency, or a corpora-
tion to determine whether he or it is usurping the functions of an officer
of the court.
Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bar Ass'n, 167 Va. 327, 335-36, 189 S.E. 153, 157
(1937).
34. The following is a typical statement of the court's inherent powers:
Though there are some decisions to the contrary [citations omit-
ted] the clear and decided weight of authority . . . is that the judicial
department, as one of three separate and independent branches of the
government of the state, has the inherent power to define, supervise,
regulate and control the practice of law and that the Legislature can not
restrict or impair this power of the courts or permit or authorize laymen
to engage in the practice of law.
West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420, 436 (1959). Many other
courts also adhere to this language. See, e.g., State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A.2d 646 (Super. Ct. 1957); Chicago Bar Ass'n v.
Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock
Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa
623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936); Lowell
Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943); In Re Opinion of the Justices,
289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); Johnson v. Childe, 147 Neb. 527, 23 N.W.2d 720
(1946); Hunter v. Kirk, 133 Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937); State Bar Ass'n v. Northern
N.J. Mortgage Ass'n, 22 N.J. 184, 123 A.2d 498 (1956).
35. Sperry v. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (state may not prohibit a person
licensed by the Patent Office from conducting patent business in state).
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legal practice in the courts and before administrative agencies also
will be undertaken.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In England, where the American legal profession has its roots,
regulation of attorneys has long been shared by the courts and by
Parliament."' The courts share in regulation only by virtue of having
been given the power by statutes of Parliament. 7 As far back as the
Middle Ages, Parliament passed laws that gave the courts authority
to control and to admit attorneys.' In turn, orders of court were
issued, requiring examination of prospective candidates; these
orders extended also to conduct and discipline of those already ad-
mitted to practice.3 A statute passed in 1605 provided penalties for
fraud and negligence, and sought to eliminate those who were un-
qualified to practice law.4"
Only those of good moral character with a sufficient amount of
learning, were sworn and thereby allowed to become members of
the legal profession.4' The English bar was born of a public demand
for exclusion of those who were unfit to practice, and it was left up
to the justices to decide who would be admitted.42 The meaning of
the word "attorney" in England was synonymous with the meaning
of "agent," and these agents for litigation were controlled by the
courts in England and looked upon as officers of those courts. 3
It is important to recognize that although English courts
played a tremendous part in regulation of early attorneys, this
power came about only as a result of statutory authority conferred
by Parliament." The courts did not begin with the power; rather, it
was delegated to them by Parliament. Of course the English Parlia-
36. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 100 (1953).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id., citing 3 James 1, ch. 7 (1605). The text of the statute is as follows:
"An act to reform the multitudes and misdemeanors of attornies and solicitors at law,
and to avoid unnecessary suits and charges at law." Id.
41. Id. at 100.
42. vom Baur, supra note 28, 48 A.B.A.J. at 716. As authority for this conclu-
sion, vom Baur cites Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122,
179 A. 139 (1935). In Rhode Island Bar, the court looked at early English statutes on
conduct of members of the legal profession and concluded such statutes were the
result of public pressure for regulation of the legal profession. Id.
43. R. POUND, supra note 36, at 98.
44. Id. at 100.
1981]
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ment, unlike the United States Congress, exercises supreme,
transcendental power that can be judicial as well as legislative.'5
This important aspect of English government has to be kept in mind
in any comparison between the English and American systems of
regulation and control of attorneys. But however different the
United States and England might be on the source of court power, it
has become the well-established rule in both countries that
representation of clients inside the courtroom is restricted to those
officers of court who are sworn and licensed to practice based on
academic and moral examination."
Practice of law inside the courtroom was reserved for at-
torneys in the United States long before the beginning of the In-
dustrial Revolution.' But with the rise of the industrial age came an
increase in government regulations,'8 and one consequence of the in-
creased government regulations was an upsurge in the amount of
legal practice outside the courtroom.'9 As administrative agencies
with quasi-judicial power were created at both state and federal
levels, new questions arose with respect to the realm of the at-
torneys and that of non-lawyers. Part of the confusion has been at-
tributed to the character of an adversary administrative pro-
45. In Re Applicants for License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906). This case con-
tains a lengthy and complete discussion of the history of regulation of the legal profes-
sion in England. At issue in the case was whether applicants to practice law must be
admitted if they complied with requirements set down by the legislature. The court
held that applicants must be admitted if they possessed the requisite qualifications,
because to do otherwise would be an invasion of legislative prerogative by the
judiciary. Id. at 2, 55 S.E. at 636.
46. Statutes in many states establish the principle. E.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-6
(1975); GA. CODE § 9-401 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. § 37:212 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-2.1
(1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-27-2 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3-103 (1980).
47. See vom Baur, supra note 28, 48 A.B.A.J. at 716. The exception to allow-
ing only attorneys in courtroom practice is that a party may appear pro se pursuant to
statute in most jurisdictions. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-5-101 (1973); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 454.18 (1965); WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.190 (1961).
48. See vom Baur, supra note 28, 48 A.B.A.J. at 716. According to vom Baur,
the increase in governmental regulations was a response at least in part to the growth
of corporations as a result of the Industrial Revolution. Id.
49. Federal and state governments have used administrative agencies to deal
with complex problems that cannot be handled effectively by the legislature or the
courts. 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Procedure § 1 (1951). In fact, the principal
reason for creation of administrative agencies was to settle disputes without the
technicalities involved in the court process. Public Service Traffic Bureau Inc. v.
Haworth Marble Co., 40 Ohio App. 374, 178 N.E. 703 (1931) (layperson negotiating
freight rates was not practicing law). The Interstate Commerce Commission is an ex-
ample of an administrative body allowing non-lawyers who possess requisite legal and
technical skills to appear. 49 C.F.R. § 1100.9(a) (1980).
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ceeding-that is, it looks like a trial in most instances, and yet it is
more informal than courtroom proceedings.
POWERS OF REGULATION
With the advent of the more informal administrative forum, the
trend has been to appoint laypeople as members of administrative
bodies."0 For example, at the federal level there is no requirement
that members of the National Labor Relations Board be attorneys. 1
The same is also true for certain state agencies.52 In creating ad-
ministrative agencies, legislatures are concerned about keeping the
proceedings informal to facilitate easy access to the agencies."
Another primary concern has been to create a system that will func-
tion as speedily and inexpensively as possible.5 As a result of this
concern for informality and easy access, it is not uncommon for
legislatures to enact statutes authorizing representation by non-
lawyers before administrative agencies.5 The same result is reached
when legislatures grant the agencies rulemaking power to deter-
mine who may appear, and pursuant to that power an agency allows
practice by laypersons. 6 Conflict is inevitable when the legislature
or the agency allows practices that courts say they have inherent
power to regulate.
Inherent Power of State Courts
State courts almost unanimously agree they have inherent
power57 to control unauthorized practice of law as a corollary of
50. See vom Baur, supra note 28, 48 A.B.A.J. at 716.
51. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1970) (National Labor Relations Board); 49 C.F.R. §
1100.9(a) (1980) (Interstate Commerce Commission); 26 C.F.R. § 601.502(b)(ii) (1980) (In-
ternal Revenue Service).
52. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 447.205 (1977) (members of Public Employees Rela-
tions Commission not required to be attorneys).
53. See note 49 supra.
54. See note 49 supra.
55. See note 25 supra.
56. See note 26 supra.
57. Inherent power of the judiciary is usually defined as the power which is
essential to the existence, function and dignity of the court by the very fact that it is a
court. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N.W.2d 302, 310 (1942); Hunter v. Kirk, 133
Neb. 625, 276 N.W. 380 (1937); In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283,
275 N.W. 265, (1937); In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97 P.2d 556 (1939).
The justification for use of inherent power by the courts in regulating practice
of law is that the legal profession is so intimately connected with judicial power in the
administration of -justice that such power is essential to the court's functions. See
generally, 21 C.J.S. Courts § 31 (1940). Inherent powers are implied by the courts from
a general grant of jurisdiction. See In re Integration of the Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133
Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265, 266 (1937).
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their right to discipline and to regulate licensed attorneys. Perhaps
the most explicit description of the extent of a court's inherent
power was set forth in Martin v. Davis.' The case involved an at-
torney, licensed to practice in both Kansas and Missouri, but with
his principal office in Missouri.5 9 A Kansas court rule required that
attorneys whose regular practices were in other states must
associate with local counsel, even though the attorneys were licensed
to practice in Kansas." For the source of power to promulgate this
rule, the Kansas Supreme Court in Martin looked to the state con-
stitution, which distributed powers of government among the ex-
ecutive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. 1 Such a
distribution of powers, patterned after the federal government, 2 is
common in state constitutions. Judicial power in Kansas, as well as
in other states, is vested in a court system typically headed by the
state supreme court. According to the Kansas Supreme Court, ex-
press power to regulate the practice of law is not necessary in order
for the court to exercise its power; the court considers itself vested
with inherent power under the constitution, arising from its crea-
tion, to accomplish objectives logically within the judicial sphere."
Because attorneys are officers of the court, the task of
regulating practice of law seems logically to fall to the judicial
branch. Consequently, most courts find as the Kansas Supreme
Court did in Martin, that they have the inherent right to "prescribe
conditions for admission to the Bar, to define, supervise, regulate
and control the practice of law, whether in or out of court.."1 5 In-
58. 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960).
59. Id. at 474, 357 P.2d at 786.
60. Id. at 476, 357 P.2d at 785. Association with local counsel requires engag-
ing an attorney with a regular practice in Kansas. The Kansas attorney then would
make the court appearances with the other attorney only assisting. Id. at 474, 357 P.2d
at 786. Although the case does not so state, the implication is that the local counsel
will split the fee with the foreign attorney. For an in-depth account of problems
regarding association that were encountered by the military, see F. MARKS, MILITARY
LAWYERS, CIVILIAN COURTS, AND THE ORGANIZED BAR (1972).
61. 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782, 787.
62. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, and IIl.
63. Forty states have separation of powers provisions in their constitutions.
The following fourteen jurisdictions have no explicit constitutional provisions for
separation of powers: Alaska, Delaware, District of Columbia, Guam, Hawaii, Kansas,
New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Virgin Islands,
Washington and Wisconsin. See J. FISCHER, supra note 12, at 5.
64. Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d at 787. For a discussion of in-
herent judicial power, see note 57 supra.
65. Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782, 788 (1960). See also Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Peo-
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herent power is necessary to preserve the being and dignity of the
court, and is not to be exercised as "an arbitrary and despotic
power . . .or because of passion, prejudice or personal hostility."'
Although acknowledging this limitation, which is essentially one of
reason, the court in Martin does not follow its own limitation, for in
the next sentence it arbitrarily refuses to define the limits of its in-
herent power. 7 In fact, the Martin court held that its power to
regulate practice of law exists notwithstanding the power of the
legislature to exercise its police power.9 Furthermore, the court was
not content to leave the legislature with its traditional police
powers to provide for the health, safety and welfare of its citizens;
this court said, for reasons it declined to disclose, the court may ex-
ercise police powers in regulating attorneys. 9
While few courts extend their inherent powers as far as in
Martin,"0 the case is an important illustration of how inherent power
is the means used to justify almost any end. Since inherent power is
implied, it is left up to the courts to decide how far the powers ex-
tend.7' The exercise of inherent power in regulating attorneys can
be justified because they are officers of the court, and it is
necessary that the court be able to rule its own officers. However,
the implied power has been stretched even further to include those
who are not attorneys. Courts exercising inherent power regulate
laypersons who may be relying on legislative authority in ap-
pearances before administrative bodies. 2
pie's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); Bump v. District Court,
232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914 (1942); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951).
66. Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782, 787 (1937).
67. Id. Regarding the limits of the court's power, the opinion stated:
It is unnecessary here to explore the limits of judicial power conferred by
that provision, but suffice it to say the practice of law is so intimately
connected and bound up with the exercise of judicial power in the ad-
ministration of justice that the right to regulate the practice naturally
and logically belongs to the judicial department of government.
Id. at 479, 357 P.2d at 787-88 (citations omitted).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 481, 357 P.2d at 790.
70. The Martin court cites only two cases as authority for extension of in-
herent power to include police power. See Workmen's Compensation Board of Ken-
tucky v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W. 533 (1930); In re Petition of Fla. State Bar
Ass'n, 40 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1949). However appealing the Martin court may have found
this Florida case, later courts in Florida have not followed the case. See note 107 infra
and accompanying text.
71. See note 57 supra.
72. See note 73 infra and accompanying text.
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Inherent Power Extended To Administrative Agencies
Many courts that have dealt with regulation of the practice of
law in the courtroom, have also had to deal with legal work before
quasi-judicial tribunals, namely, administrative agencies. Most courts
have very little trouble in finding that their power extends outside
the courtroom to proceedings before administrative bodies." "[I]t is
the character of the act and not the place where the act is per-
formed, which is the decisive factor"7 in determining if a particular
case. involves unauthorized practice of law.
The power to enforce rules prohibiting practice by un-
authorized persons is a function of the court's authority to license
those who are fit to practice and to forbid others from practice."5
From these powers, it follows that the court also may regulate those
who are practicing without licenses, even though those persons may
never have been before the court."'
73. E.g., Eagle Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n of Cal., 217 Cal.
244, 18 P.2d 341 (1933) (Industrial Accident Commission); Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Good-
man, 366 I1. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937) (Workmen's Compensation Board); Public Service
Comm'n v. Hahn Transportation, 253 Md. 571, 253 A.2d 845 (1969) (Public Service Com-
mission); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937) (Public Service Commis-
sion); Stack v. P.G. Garage, Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951) (County Tax Board).
74. Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20, 21 (1937). This language often is
used in unauthorized practice cases to counter the argument that one can only practice
law in a courtroom. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901, 907; Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381, 382
(1941).
75. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901, 906 (1931). This case dealt with a bank which, through its attorneys, con-
ducted almost every imaginable form of legal business, with the possible exception of
divorce. Id. at 464, 176 N.E. at 903. A corporation cannot practice law, nor can it hire
attorneys to practice law for it. E.g., Los Angeles Bar Ass'n v. California Protective
Corp., 76 Cal. App. 354, 244 P. 1089 (1926); Dworken v. Apartment House Owners
Ass'n, 38 Ohio App. 265, 176 N.E. 577 (1931).
Although the People's Stock Yards case involved practice of law by a bank
through its attorneys, it is often cited for the proposition that prohibition of
unauthorized practice follows from the court's authority to license attorneys. There
are many other cases in the same vein. See, e.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust
Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); Bassi v. Langloss, 22 Ill. 2d 190, 174 N.E.2d 682
(1961).
76. Persons who may find themselves before the court on unauthorized prac-
tice charges without ever having represented anyone in court include: realtors, accoun-
tants, debt poolers, labor officials, architects, insurance adjusters, and estate planners.
E.g., Florida Bar v. Moses, No. 53,305 (Sup. Ct. Fla., filed 1978) (labor contract
negotiator); Fatzer v. Schm'itt, 174 Kan. 581, 258 P.2d 228 (1953) (advice on trusts); Fit-
chette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254 N.W. 910 (1934) (insurance adjuster); Automobile
Club v. Hoffmeister, 338 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. App. 1960) (auto club representative).
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To deny the power of the court to deal with such of-
fenders would be tantamount to a destruction of the
power [to license attorneys] itself. Perhaps the major por-
tion of the actual practice of law under modern conditions
consists of the work of attorneys outside of any court and
has nothing to do with any court."
Courts do not exercise these broad powers regulating legal practice
without some justification, which is usually phrased as protection of
the public.7"
Reasons For Regulation
"The practice of law is affected with a public interest."7 9
Therefore it must be regulated primarily in order to promote the
public welfare. A secondary or incidental purpose for regulating
unauthorized practice is to assure licensed attorneys the protection
of their professions.0 It is not the selfish interest of lawyers that is
being protected, but the public's right to skilled, competent and
qualified persons.8 ' "Not only this, he must be served disinterestedly
by a lawyer who is his lawyer, not motivated or controlled by a
divided or outside allegiance." 2 One cannot seriously argue that the
practice of law in the courtroom, with its complex evidentiary and
procedural rules, should not be restricted to licensed attorneys, for
all of the reasons set forth above. But there are some countervailing
considerations which should be articulated before any court adopts
the "public interest" as an all-important consideration to guide a
decision on unauthorized practice of law outside the courtroom.
77. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901, 906 (1931).
78. See note 6 supra.
79. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 51 R.I. 122, 179 A.
139, 143 (1935) (automobile club representative could not make court appearance for
someone els). For more on the automobile club and unauthorized practice, see Collins,
Automobile Club Activities: The Problem from the Standpoint of the Clubs, 5 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1938).
80. Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 51 R.I. 122, 179 A.
139 (1935). See also Depew v. Wichita Ass'n of Credit Men, 142 Kan. 403, 49 P.2d 1041
(1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 710 (1936) (attorneys possess privilege and duty to protect
themselves and courts from illegal conduct); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191 Minn. 582, 254
N.W. 910 (1934) (attorneys as officers of the court have a franchise and a property
right to protect).
81. Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So.2d 1186 (1978) (person legally may sell
do-it-yourself divorce kits, but may not give assistance in preparing the forms).
82. Bump v. District Court, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W.2d 914, 922 (1942).
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It may be in the public interest to allow laypersons to repre-
sent clients before administrative agencies. In some instances
laypersons are more familiar with the legal intricacies of cases than
an attorney would be. Labor law is one area where knowledge of the
law of the shop may be more important than basic legal skills such
as knowledge of relevancy and materiality of evidence.8 An at-
torney, for example, who spends all of his or her time drawing up
documents relating to real estate transactions will be ill-suited to
represent a client before a state or national labor tribunal on an
issue that deals with intimate knowledge of the steel industry.
Likewise, an attorney is best qualified to appear in courtroom pro-
ceedings when the emphasis is on formality, strict adherence to the
rules of evidence, and where trial tactics can be the all-important
difference between winning or losing. For the most part, cases in-
volving lay practitioners before administrative agencies overlook
these considerations. Courts should stop to consider that in creating
administrative agencies the legislature might have considered pre-
cisely the public interest and decided such an interest would benefit
from representation by laypersons. On the contrary, however, the
courts often summarily dismiss any legislative action as encroach-
83. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960). This case involved an alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement. The
agreement had an arbitration clause, and the court was called upon to decide whether
the contracting-out of certain work in alleged violation of the agreement was a ques-
tion for the courts or for the arbitrator.
In deciding the issue in favor of an arbitrator, Justice Douglas said:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the
courts; the considerations which help him fashion a judgment may indeed
be foreign to the competence of the courts .... The labor arbitrator is
usually chosen because of the parties' confidence in his knowledge of the
common law of the shop. . . . The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determina-
tion of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed.
Id. at 581-82.
Warrior & Gulf recognizes the value of experts in the informal Setting of ar-
bitration. An analogy can be made between the value of experts in arbitration, and
their value in an administrative proceeding. One state court has come out solidly in
favor of lay experts, even though the weight of state authority is to the contrary. See
Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59
A.2d 863 (1948) ("The most important body of experts in industrial relations are the of-
ficers and business agents of the labor unions-and few of them are lawyers.") Id. at
602, 53 A.2d at 802. Contra, Dunbar v. McClellan, 168 Colo. 202, 434 P.2d 126 (1967)
(laypersons advising on taxes and trusts was unauthorized practice); Johnson v. Childe,
139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941) (transportation expert guilty of unauthorized
practice).
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ment upon the judiciary, without sufficient consideration of the
powers that attach to the respective branches of government."
Legislative Powers
One major consideration should be the wishes of state
legislatures. Courts have for the most part ignored state
legislatures as sources of guidance for definitions of the practice of
law." Courts are faced with separation of powers problems" when a
legislature creates an administrative agency and gives it rulemaking
power. When, pursuant to that power, the agency makes a rule that
anyone may appear by counsel or other representative, 7 it is the lay
specialist who suffers when he or she represents a client and later
ends up becoming the target of a lawsuit charging unauthorized
practice of law."
The remedy for this takeover by the judiciary of legislative
functions is a respect for legislative policy decisions." In regulating
the practice of law, courts have moved from their historic function
84. One of the theories behind administrative law is that experts shoula
decide certain issues in the first instance, as opposed to having the issues first decided
by a judge or a jury. See Palmer v. Mass., 308 U.S. 79 (1939); Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co.-v. Galloway, 168 Or. 85, 121 P.2d 469 (1942).
85. Statutes in each of the following cases were struck down as unconstitu-
tional. See Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652 (1961); Meunier v. Bernich,
170 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936); In re Brown, Weiss & Wohl, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192
N.E.2d 54 (1963); Lineberger v. Beeler, 174 Tenn. 538, 129 S.W.2d 198 (1939).
86. See Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of In-
herent Judicial Power, 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 162 (1960). The basic thesis of this comment
is that courts fail to distinguish between their realm of power and that of the
legislatures. This failure has resulted in judicial restraint on legislative authorization
of practice before administrative bodies. Id. at 163. A more general discussion of
separation of powers as it relates to unauthorized practice can be found in Robertson
and Buehler, The Separation of Powers and the Regulation of the Practice of Law in
Oregon, 13 WILLAMETTE L.J. 273 (1976).
87. See note 13 supra.
88. The punishment for unauthorized practice is criminal contempt of court.
E.g., Indianapolis Bar Ass'n v. Fletcher Trust Co., 211 Ind. 27, 5 N.E.2d 538 (1937); In
re Pilini, 122 Vt. 385, 173 A.2d 828 (1961). See also Annot., 36 A.L.R. 533 (1925);
Annot., 100 A.L.R. 236 (1936) (practicing law unauthorized is contempt of court).
In addition to a contempt charge, the court may issue an injunction to restrain
unauthorized practice of law. See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Investment Co. v.
Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Smith v. Illinois Adjustment
Finance Co., 326 Ill. App. 654, 63 N.E.2d 264 (1945); Bump v. Barnett, 235 Iowa 308, 16
N.W.2d 579 (1944).
89. See Comment, Control of Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of In-
herent Judicial Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 162, 166 (1960).
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of protecting the judicial process to protecting the public.' In so do-
ing, courts have confused their goals of protecting the judicial
system with the legislative police power over health, safety and
welfare of citizens." Any practice by laypersons that will harm the
public can be the subject of judicial action, as a result of this rever-
sal of roles." Justification for assumption of this power is that the
court's ability to regulate members of the bar would be ineffective if
laypersons could practice without restriction." Exactly how much
authority the court reserves for itself depends in large measure
upon its view of the degree of legislative power it has over the prac-
tice of law.'
Four Theories of Legislative Power
Four theories have emerged from decisions by the courts in
recognition of legislative powers regarding the practice of law. One
theory is that the legislature has concurrent power with the court to
regulate and control the practice of law." This theory recognizes
that legislative powers are at the very least equal to those of the
judiciary and thus places some limitations on the scope of the
90. Id. For a good example of a court's confusion of powers, see Rhode Island
State Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935).
(automobile association charged with unauthorized practice). The Rhode Island court
first considered a statute giving the supreme court power to regulate admission of at-
torneys to the courts. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 2 ch. 322 (1923). From that specific grant of
power, the court said it derived inherent power to control practice of law, both in and
out of court. Later in the opinion the court conceded that it was the legislature's duty
under the police power to protect the public welfare. But the court said it also could
exercise power to protect the public. Id. at 126, 179 A. at 143. In effect, the court
decided to legislate on unauthorized practice, even though the General Assembly
already had defined what it considered to be unauthorized practice.
91. See, e.g., West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420,
435 (1959); Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 617,
251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952).
92. See In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1951) (broad concept of
inherent powers); Petition of Fla. Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of
Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940) (court refused to issue new rules of civil procedure,
leaving the matter to the legislature). The opinion states: "[T]his court was powerless
to promulgate a rule which had the effect of enacting or repealing a statute involving
jurisdiction or substantive law." Id. at 59.
93. In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1951).
94. For a summary of states and how their courts view legislative power to
govern practice of law, see Annot., 144 A.L.R. 138, 152 (1943).
95. See Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1953); Petition of Fla. State Bar
Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (Fla. 1940);
Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930).
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court's inherent power. This position is a minority view, with
Florida being the only state in which it is operative."
A second theory, which is held in the majority of jurisdictions,
is that the legislature may pass laws only in aid of the judiciary
where the practice of law is concerned. 7 Any attempts by the
legislature to encroach upon the court's territory are regarded with
great suspicion, even to the extent of powers that traditionally lie
with the legislature." As a result of this theory, administrative prac-
tice by persons other than lawyers is severely curtailed, if not
eliminated, even though it may be based upon statutory authority."
Because the statutory authority is open to question, courts adopting
this theory feel free to strike down any statute which is at odds
with the court's authority. Under this theory, the legislature's
power clearly is subordinate to judicial power.
The third theory embodies the fullest extension of the court's
power. With this theory, the legislature has no power over the prac-
tice of law, and any law that is even remotely controlling of the
legal profession is subject to being summarily struck down as a
96. See note 95 supra.
97. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 P. 29 (1926) (statute cannot limit
court's power to disbar attorney); Jones v. State, 61 Ga. App. 860, 7 S.E.2d 398 (1940);
Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 728
(1937) (neither General Assembly nor state agency could authorize practice of law
before state industrial commission); Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 90 (1931) (practice of law by using bank's attorneys as
intermediaries was unauthorized); Meunier v. Bernich, 70 So. 567 (La. Ct. App. 1936)
(statute excepting adjusters from unauthorized practice regulations violates separation
of powers); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 324, 85 A.2d 505 (1951) (legislature may pass statutes in
aid of, but not superseding power of judiciary); In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97 P.2d
556 (1939) (legislature may prescribe rules and regulations for admission to bar, but
such regulations must not be unreasonable); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile
Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935) (act defining unauthorized practice does
not take matter out of supervision of court).
98. For example, the police powers are traditionally thought to be in the
realm of the legislature but in one case the court said it, and not the legislature, could
exercise the police power. See Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782 (1960).
99. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937) (administrative rule pursuant to legislative act was un-
constitutional because it allowed practice by non-lawyers); Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So.
567 (La. Ct. App. 1936) (statute excepting lay adjusters from regulation of practice of
law violates separation of powers); In re Brown, Weiss & Wohl, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192
N.E.2d 54 (1963) (state constitution does not authorize industrial commission to permit
practice of law by laypersons).
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usurpation of inherent judicial power.00 Here, again, inherent
judicial power is the key word used in justification of the great
power wielded.' '
Theory four lies at the opposite end of the spectrum from
theory three, in that the legislature exercises full power over the
area of the practice of law.'0 2 The courts exercise power, clearly
subordinate to legislative power, only if such power has been
delegated by the legislature.' New York' 4 and North Carolina'05 are
the only states following this rule. Although these two state courts
are a minority, the federal government apparently follows this
theory, and the federal judiciary has continued to exist and to func-
tion without the broad powers that so many state courts feel they
need.0 6 A consideration of all four theories, together with a look at
the system used by the federal government, will illustrate exactly
how the courts use their power in relation to the legislature in mat-
ters affecting the practice of law.
100. See, e.g., Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941) (power to
define what constitutes practice of law is an exclusive judicial function); Clark v.
Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937) (any effort by legislature to regulate prac-
tice of law would be unconstitutional); West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504,
101 S.W.2d 977 (1937) (Workmen's Compensation Commission has no power to
authorize appearance by laypersons).
101. See note 57 supra.
102. In re Bercu, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 273 App. Div.
524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), affd mem., 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949); In re
Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 11 Abb. Pr. 301 (1860).
103. See note 102 supra.
104. See In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 11 Abb. Pr. 301 (1860). See generally J.
FISCHER, supra note 12, at 5.
105. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936)
(legislature has plenary power to regulate admission to bar); In re Applicants for
License, 143 N.C. 1, 55 S.E. 635 (1906).
106. See Statement of Walter Gellhorn, in Cincinnati Conference on Law and
Lawyers in the Modern World, 15 U. CIN. L. REv. 196, 197-98 (1941). Commenting on
practice before federal administrative agencies, Gellhorn said:
Eradication of whatever defects there may be in prevailing controls over
practice before federal agencies is peculiarly a matter within the com-
petence of the national legislature and of the administrative bodies
themselves. The Supreme Court has never expressed the belief ap-
parently held by some state courts, that prescribing qualifications for ad-
ministrative practice is an inherently judicial power. On the contrary, in
Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926), the
court held that an administrative tribunal, even in the absence of explicit
statutory authorization to do so, may properly establish standards of ad-
mission to practice before it.
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Theory One-Supreme Court and Legislature
Have Concurrent Jurisdiction
The Florida Supreme Court recognizes that its jurisdiction
over the practice of law is concurrent with that of the legislature."'
In Barr v. Watts0 8 the legislature's power to control practice of law
received a direct challenge; respondents in the lawsuit alleged that
the legislature had withdrawn from the field, and left it to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the court. At issue was a statute that
delegated power to the supreme court to establish procedures for
the state's board of bar examiners. '" In addition, the statute gave
the court authority to establish qualifications and requirements for
admission to practice in Florida.' The court recognized its concur-
rent authority with the legislature, citing a previous case in which
the state bar association had attempted to have the court pro-
mulgate new rules of civil procedure."'
The case cited by the Barr court construed the Florida Con-
stitution as dividing rulemaking power regarding practice of law
between the legislature and the judiciary."' Further, the cited case
recognized that when the legislature has entered the field, its acts
should be respected."' Inherent power of the court is asserted, but
limited to areas where the field has not been narrowed by
legislative occupation.' Notwithstanding the separation of powers
107. Barr v. Watts, 70 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1953) (legislature has power to prescribe
qualifications for admission to practice law; the power is concurrent with Supreme
Court's power); Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of
Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940) (Florida Constitution vests concurrent jurisdiction
with court and legislature); Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930) (admission to
practice law is subject of legislative regulation).
108. 70 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1953).
109. Id. at 349.
110. Id.
111. Id., citing Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla.
Rules of Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940).
112. Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of
Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940). The Florida Constitution of 1885 states that: "The
Legislature shall not pass special or local laws ... regulating the practice of courts of
justice, except municipal courts." FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 20. Regarding the powers of the
supreme court, the constitution of 1885, as amended in 1902, states: "[Tihe [Supreme]
Court may . . . exercise any of its powers . . . under such regulations as may be
prescribed by law or by the rule of said Court not inconsistent therewith." FLA. CONST.
art. 5, § 4.
113. Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass'n for Promulgation of New Fla. Rules of
Civil Procedure, 199 So. 57 (1940).
114. The limitation was expressed by the court as follows: "[The Legislature
may prescribe rules of practice and the court may prescribe such rules not inconsistent
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doctrine, the court recognized that in fact it often is difficult to
separate the legislative from the judicial functions. The court stated:
"There has never been a time in the history of this doctrine [separa-
tion of powers] when the powers of one department have not
depended on or have been aided in some way by those of another."" 5
The concurrence of powers in the legislature and the supreme
court was illustrated further in Florida Bar v. Moses."6 Moses in-
volved representation by a layperson in a quasi-judicial
proceeding."7 The representation was pursuant to Florida's Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, which allowed representation by a
"qualified representative.""' In Moses the court acknowledged its
own power to regulate the practice of law and to prohibit
unauthorized practice."' But the court also found that under
Florida's constitution the legislature may oust the court's jurisdic-
tion over the practice of law and convert unauthorized practice into
authorized practice.'2 Although the legislature had validly delegated
power in the Administrative Procedure Act, the agency's exercise of
the delegated power was held to be invalid because the agency had
not complied with the statutory requirement of determining who
should be allowed to practice as a "qualified representative.""' The
with those passed by the Legislature, but those passed by the Legislature will not be
respected if they hamper administration of justice or are for any reason unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 59.
115. Id. Illustrative of this point is the joint venture of the legislature and
judiciary in making procedural rules. The legislature passes enabling acts allowing the
court to make rules affecting its procedure. Id.
116. 380 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1980).
117. Id. Moses was a labor contract negotiator who represented a school board
in an unfair labor practice proceeding before Florida's Public Employees Relations
Commission.
118. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.62(2) (West 1975). The pertinent section of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act states: "Any person compelled to appear, or who appears
voluntarily, before any hearing officer or agency in an investigation or in any agency
proceeding has the right, at his own expense, to be accompanied, represented, and ad-
vised by counsel or other qualified representative." Id.
119. Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 417 (1980). Article V, Section 15 of
the Florida Constitution sets forth the supreme court's power: "The supreme court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of
law and the discipline of persons admitted."
120. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 1. "Commissions established by law, or ad-
ministrative officers or bodies may be granted quasi-judicial power in matters con-
nected with the functions of their offices." Id.
121. Florida Bar v. Moses, 380 So. 2d 412, 418 (1980). The court held that the
agency should have specific standards of competency and professional responsibility.
Id. In the absence of those standards, Moses was found to have been practicing law
unauthorized.
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court pointed out that in the absence of legislative authorization for
representation by laypersons, the court has constitutional power to
regulate unauthorized practice of law.'"
Theory Two-Legislature May Pass Laws In Aid of the Judiciary
The Florida court's liberality in finding that the legislature
may oust the court's jurisdiction over the practice of law is in stark
contrast to the way the court treated the legislature's power in Il-
linois. In Illinois the rule was that the legislature could pass laws "in
aid of the judiciary."'" Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman involved
practice before the state's industrial commission, which is an ad-
ministrative agency created by the legislature. As a result of power
delegated by the Illinois legislature, the commission promulgated a
rule allowing representation by an "agent" of the parties.'24 Pur-
suant to the rule, defendant had built up a business representing
clients before the commission. ' Although not a lawyer, he per-
formed services that required substantial knowledge of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, as well as the common law liability for damages from injury.'"
Those things constituted the practice-of law, according to the court,
even though the activities were allowed by the agency, and ap-
parently also by the legislature.'21 The Goodman case is strikingly
similar to the Moses case, but the outcome was the exact opposite.
It is clear from the outcome in Goodman that while the court is will-
ing to give some consideration to legislative power, the court con-
siders the legislature subordinate in matters relating to the practice
of law.
Holding that the General Assembly had no authority to grant
non-lawyers the right to practice law, the court said any attempt at
122. Id at 417. See FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 15.
123. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941, cert. denied, 302
U.S. 728 (1937).
124. Id. at 352, 8 N.E.2d at 945. The legislature, in an attempt to simplify the
proceedings, passed the following law regarding operation of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Board: "The board shall make and publish rules and orders for carrying out the
duties imposed upon it by law ... and the process and procedure before the board
shall be as simple ... as reasonably may be." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 155 (Smith-Hurd
1935). It was as a result of this statutory grant of power that the board allowed
representation by an "agent."
125. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 348, 8 N.E.2d 941, 943, cer
denied, 302 U.S. 728 (1937).
126. Id. at 356, 8 N.E.2d at 946.
127. Id. at 358, 8 N.E.2d at 947.
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giving the privilege to one not a licensed attorney was void. " In
reaching that conclusion, the court had to deal not only with the
legislation in question, but with an identical case that arose in Ohio
and reached a directly opposite result."9 The Ohio court presented
the other side of the coin. Rather than focusing on encroachment
into the legal profession, the court looked at the purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Finding that one of the main pur-
poses of the act was to provide a speedy, inexpensive disposition of
claims, the court went on to say that in most instances no special
skill is required in the preparation and presentation of claims."M
One characteristic of cases in which laypersons are prohibited
from appearing before administrative bodies is over-emphasis on the
amount of legal skills required, without a corresponding look at the
objectives of the administrative agency. 3 ' Often the administrative
body itself is composed of non-lawyers, or at least there is no re-
quirement that its members be attorneys."2 Further adding to the
overall informality of the proceedings, there is generally no require-
ment of adherence to the rules of evidence or procedure." This be-
128. Id. at 352, 8 N.E.2d at 945.
129. Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936). In Goodman the
Ohio Workmen's Compensation Board was created with full power to make its own
rules. The board was not bound by rules of evidence or procedure. Id. at 428, 200 N.E.
at 471. The court held that a non-lawyer may appear in a representative capacity
without violating unauthorized practice rules. Id.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 Il1. 346, 350, 8 N.E.2d 941,
946 (1937) (workmen's compensation action involves many delicate questions of law and
fact); West Va. State Bar Ass'n v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420, 434 (1959)
(difficult and complicated questions arise under workmen's compensation act). But see,
e.g., Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 437, 200 N.E. 470, 471 (1936) (vast majority of
cases require no special skill in the preparation of claims).
132. Goodman v. Beall, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936). See National
Labor Relations Act § 3(a), 29 U.S.C. § 151-59 (1970).
133. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5708 (1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §
11(2) (1979).
Although administrative hearings look like regular courtroom non-jury trials,
there are basic differences where the law of evidence is concerned. In the first place,
agency hearings usually produce evidence of general conditions, rather than facts
relating to the respondent. See generally 1 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, ch.
1 (1970 Supp.). Another important difference is that an administrative hearing is tried
before an examiner instead of a judge or jury. Consequently, since many of the rules
governing admission of evidence are designed to protect the jury from unreliable
evidence, the rationale for using these rules becomes less important. See BENJAMIN,
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 174-75 (1942). Recognizing
these differences in administrative hearings, Congress passed 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1946),
which provides that "any oral or documentary evidence may be received in an ad-
ministrative hearing."
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ing so, there is little reason to require attorneys to appear before a
board of laypersons."u Recognizing that principle, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit said:
The [Federal Interstate Commerce] Commission is an ad-
ministrative body. The validity of its proceedings is not
dependent upon compliance with procedural rules as to
pleading and practice which prevail in courts of law. It
may conduct its proceedings in such a manner as will best
be conducive to the proper dispatch of business and to the
ends of justice.' 5
Rather than leave the regulation of agency business to the legis-
lature, as the federal courts have done,'36 a majority of state courts
feel they must regulate the practice of law before agencies.' 7
When the legislature has enacted a law, obviously there is an
intent to enter the field and not to leave it to the discretion of the
courts; in the interest of predictability and judicial economy, the
best course of action for the courts would be to honor the legislative
action.'" The validity of this reasoning is best illustrated by the
many lawsuits involving lay practice before administrative
agencies.'" If the courts must exercise inherent power to regulate
practice of law, a certain amount of restraint is advisable, especially
when no harm to the public is alleged.' 0
A good example of judicial discretion is set forth in Reynolds v.
Dinger."4 The court said the filling out of deed forms was the prac-
134. See generally Goodman v. BeaU, 130 Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470 (1936).
135. Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 295 F.
53, 56 (5th Cir. 1923), affd, 269 U.S. 217, cited with approval in Goodman v. Beall, 130
Ohio St. 427, 200 N.E. 470, 472 (1936).
136. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Goldsmith v. United States Board
of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
137. See note 206 infra.
138. This idea was vividly expressed by the court in Barr v. Watts, 70 So.2d
347, 351 (Fla. 1953):
We now have in this state [Florida] to carry on the state's business almost
100 state agencies, boards and commissions, most of whose members hold
office by executive appointment. The people of this state have the right
to expect that each and every such state agency will promptly carry out
and put into effect the will of the people as expressed in the legislative
acts of their duly elected representatives.
Id.
139. See, e.g., cases cited note 14 supra.
140. See generally Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
141. Id. In Reynolds the legislature had created a real estate board, endowing
it with rulemaking power. A challenge to the rule was filed on the ground that it
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tice of law, but because the bar had acquiesced in the activity for
one hundred years, at least it was not unauthorized."' With the
following language the court stated that a commonsense approach,
taking into consideration the current practices, would be best:
It is the duty of this court so to regulate the practice of
law and to restrain such practice by laymen in a com-
monsense way in order to protect primarily the interest of
the public and not to hamper and burden such interest
with impractical technical restraints no matter how well
supported such restraint may be from the standpoint of
pure logic.'
Feeling that it was in the public interest to allow realtors to con-
tinue filling out simple conveyances, the court chose not to use its
inherent power to ban such a practice.'4 All jurisdictions have not
followed this precedent. In some states the courts refuse to
acknowledge any power in the legislature over the practice of law.""
allowed realtors to fill in standardized legal forms and thereby practice law without a
license. Id.
142. Id. at 199, 109 N.W.2d at 691. Having acknowledged that the practice had
been occurring for 100 years, the court was forced to say it was authorized, or else ad-
mit that the court itself had been lax for a long time in not putting a stop to it. One
hundred years of experience without harm to the public convinced the court that little
would be gained by imposing a requirement that attorneys be used for all real estate
conveyances. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. Besides Reynolds, the latest major case involving realtors filling in
standard forms was Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, 34 Il. 2d 116, 214 N.E.2d
771 (1966). In Quinlan the court held that a real estate broker may fill out standard
earnest money contracts, but all other documents require the services of an attorney.
Id. Jurisdictions other than Illinois and Wisconsin have a wide variety of rules regard-
ing which documents may be prepared by a broker. See, e.g., Arkansas Bar Ass'n v.
Block, 230 Ark. 430, 323 S.W.2d 912 (1959) (offers and acceptances may be completed
by brokers); Conway-Bogue Investment Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 213
P.2d 998 (1957) (receipts, options to purchase, contracts of sale, deeds, promissory
notes, mortgages, releases, leases and demands to vacate may be prepared by
brokers); Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950) (brokers may
prepare sale contracts, deposit receipts); Ingham Bar Ass'n v. Weller Co., 342 Mich.
214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955) (deeds, land contracts, mortgages, can be completed by
brokers). See generally Adler, Are Real Estate Agents Entitled to Practice A Little
Law? 4 ARIZ. L. REV. 188 (1963); Marks, Lawyers and Realtors: Arizona's Experience,
49 A.B.A.J. 139 (1963).
145. Missouri and West Virginia are the two jurisdictions adhering to a strict
separation of powers doctrine regarding unauthorized practice of law. See Clark v.
Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937); West Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va.
504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
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Theory Three-Strict Separation of Powers
In jurisdictions that require a strict construction of the separa-
tion of powers doctrine, no intrusion into judicial regulation of the
practice of law is allowed. According to the court in Clark v.
Austin,' if control of the practice of law is judicial in nature, then
an anomalous result would be reached if the legislature had the
same power. 4 ' Statutes involved in the case defined the practice of
law in Missouri, and provided penalties for unauthorized practice.' 8
The court, in effect, struck down the statutes and found the defend-
ants in contempt of court, based upon the court's inherent power to
regulate unauthorized practice of law. 49 Without discussion, the
court concluded that appearances on behalf of others before the
public service commission constituted the practice of law by non-
lawyers.' Inherent power to make this determination is found in
the Missouri Constitution, which vests judicial power in the
courts. 5 ' No other grounds were listed for the decision, which puts
all matters related to the practice of law exclusively within the
court's province.'52 And the court is free to decide for itself what it
believes is in the realm of practice of law. Needless to say, this
reasoning leaves the court free to exercise broad powers, not strictly
judicial.
Although purporting to exercise its judicial power, the court is
in reality encroaching upon the police powers of the legislature.'5
As the concurring opinion by Judge Ellison in Clark points out, if
the court, by virtue of its inherent powers, completely excludes the
legislature from the field of legal practice and procedure, many
statutes in addition to the ones questioned in the case are un-
constitutional."' To illustrate the extent of the powers being taken
by the court:
146. 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937).
147. Id.
148. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 11692 (1929) (practice of law defined to include any act
performed in representation of another before commission); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 11693
(1929) (forbids engaging in practice of law as defined in § 11692 unless person is an at-
torney).
149. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937) (unauthorized practice
charges stemmed from appearance before state public service commission).
150. Id. at 478, 101 S.W.2d 985.
151. MO. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
152. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977, 980 (1937).
153. Id. at 489, 101 S.W.2d at 985 (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
154. Id. at 484, 101 S.W.2d at 986.
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[Iff, by reason of the fact that we have inherent power to
prescribe rules of practice and procedure, the General
Assembly is excluded from the field of procedural law,
then it necessarily follows that our whole code of civil pro-
cedure of nearly 1,000 sections, our code of criminal pro-
cedure of about 500 sections, and the statutes providing a
procedure for the liquidation of insolvent banks and the
reorganization of building and loan associations are un-
constitutional and must fall. .. 11
As the above quotation shows, a strict separation of powers in prac-
tice would entail revamping the entire state government, a result
which obviously is not practical. Not only is such a drastic separa-
tion impractical, but it destroys the legislature's prerogative to ex-
ercise its police powers.' 6 Instead of promoting a separation of
powers, the court has set itself up as supreme legislator in any field
that it might find impinging upon the practice of law. Of course, the
practice of law has implications for so many different fields in so
many areas of government that even the courts themselves admit
they cannot define what is or is not the practice of law."'
In those decisions that use inherent power to justify regulation
of administrative practice, the courts apparently disregard the fact
that legislatures have police powers to protect the health, safety
and welfare of its citizens." The police power ought to extend to
prescribing qualifications for those who practice before commissions
155. Id.
156. Although Article III of the Missouri Constitution provides for a separa-
tion of powers, in practice the separation is not complete. See Manion v. Davison, 284
Mo. 469, 506, 225 S.W. 97, 100 (1930), cited in Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 486, 101
S.W.2d 977, 979 (1937) (Ellison, C.J., concurring).
157. This hesitancy may be in large part due to the language in the ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 3-5: "It is neither necessary nor desirable to at-
tempt the formulation of a single, specific definition of what constitutes the practice of
law."
When definitions are attempted, they often border on the absurd for someone
looking at the definition and trying to apply it to a fact situation. See, e.g., Arizona
State Bar v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961) (practice of
law consists of acts lawyers customarily carried on from day to day through the cen-
turies); Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 481-82, 48 N.W.2d 788, 797 (1951) (in tax
practice, a layperson may not solve a difficult legal question); Fitchette v. Taylor, 191
Minn. 582, 584, 254 N.W. 910, 911 (1934) (if compensation is exacted, all advice to
clients in connection with the law is practice of law); Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101
S.W.2d 977, 982 (1937) (person is practicing law when for valuable consideration he or
she gives advice on legal rights).
158. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 496, 101 S.W.2d 977, 995 (1937).
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that exercise delegated legislative power.159 Any regulation by the
judiciary should be declared a usurpation of legislative powers,
although few courts recognize it as such. 6' Instead, the courts tor-
ture logic to retain complete control of every aspect of the legal pro-
fession, without regard to whether the public is in fact being harmed
by an alleged unauthorized practice.
Protection of the public was one of the main reasons given for
decision in West Virginia State Bar v. Earley."' The court said:
It would indeed be an anomaly if the power of the courts
to protect the public from the improper or unlawful prac-
tice of law were limited to licensed attorneys and did not
extend or apply to incompetent and unqualified laymen
and lay agencies. Such a limitation would reduce the legal
profession to an unskilled vocation, destroy the usefulness
of licensed attorneys, as officers of the courts, and
substantially impair and disrupt the orderly administra-
tion of justice. . .. "'
Logically, if detriment to the public from unskilled persons was the
main consideration, and no issue of incompetence was raised, it
would seem the court should have allowed the man to continue his
practice, since the public was not being harmed by him.' However,
the court in Earley held that representing others before ad-
ministrative bodies is the practice of law."' The holding overlooks
.clear legislative intent to allow the workmen's compensation com-
mission to regulate the agency's hearing procedure. '65 An analysis of
the court's reasoning in Earley' " reveals the same judicial encroach-
ment on legislative power that was the hallmark of the Clark deci-
sion. 6' But unlike the courts in Clark and Earley, one state court
gave explicit recognition to legislative action regarding ad-
ministrative agencies.
159. Id. at 499, 101 S.W.2d at 996.
160. See Comment, Control of the Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of In-
herent Judicial Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 162 (1960).
161. 144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420, 435 (1959).
162. Id. at 524, 109 S.E.2d at 440 (statute empowering state compensation com-
missioner to adopt rules of procedure does not authorize him to promulgate rules
allowing practice by non-lawyers.)
163. It should be noted that "the public" did not bring this lawsuit--the West
Virginia Bar did. Id. at 504, 109 S.E.2d at 420.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 523, 109 S.E.2d at 439.
166. Id.
167. Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937) (Ellison, C.J., concurr-
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Auerbacher v. Wood: State Court
Recognition of Congressional Authority
Such recognition was granted the United States Congress in
Auerbacher v. Wood," a case involving practice before the National
Labor Relations Board. The New Jersey court in Auerbacher said an
agency of the federal government, acting pursuant to authority
granted by Congress, may regulate representation before such agen-
cy, and the state court is without power to interfere.' In addition to
the statutory basis for the decision, the court recognized that labor
relations is a specialty where laypersons traditionally have been
allowed free reign, because factual knowledge of industry is often
more important in those cases than legal knowledge. 7 ' Indeed, in the
field of labor relations, the most important body of experts are of-
ficers and business agents of labor unions."' Any legal skills that
such a person might employ are purely incidental to his or her
primary job as an industrial relations expert. 7 '
Where the primary service is non-legal, purely incidental use of
legal knowledge does not characterize the service as wrongful prac-
tice of law.' In Auerbacher the court exercised restraint in dealing
with industrial relations experts charged with unauthorized practice
in the following words:
The court should be very cautious about declaring a
widespread, well-established method of conducting
business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of men
who customarily perform a certain function have no right
to do so, or that the technical education given by our
school cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.'
168. 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), affd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863
(1948) (defendant was a labor relations expert who opened an office and was soliciting
clients when unauthorized practice charges were filed against him).
169. Id. at 604, 53 A.2d at 803. Auerbacher was cited as authority in Fla. Bar
v. Moses, 380 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1980).
170. Id. at 602, 53 A.2d at 802. Industrial relations is in itself a recognized pro-
fession. The major universities offer courses in industrial relations. Id. at 603, 53 A.2d
at 802.
171. Id. at 602, 53 A.2d at 802. Use of non-lawyer experts by labor unions is
largely a matter of custom.
172. Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948). The appeals
court recognized that in the field of industrial relations, there is an overlap into the
legal area. Solving a particular labor problem might well involve use of some legal
knowledge.
173. Id.
174. Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 600, 53 A.2d 800, 802 (1947).
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Realistic guidelines in Auerbacher are set up to determine the
dividing line between when use of legal knowledge is incidental and
when use of legal skills becomes unauthorized practice of law. One
should look at the person's work as a whole for a particular client; if
the primary nature of the work is advice as to legal obligations,
then it is unauthorized practice. '75 An analogy is made to the work
of the architect and its relationship to the law: "The law only pro-
vides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building the architect may plan.""" In Auerbacher,
at both the trial and the appellate levels, any separation of powers
concerns were clearly subordinate to a practical consideration of the
kinds of activities that a given occupation might encompass. In fact,
it is only at the end of the trial court's opinion that there is any
discussion of the statutory authorization for representation before
the NLRB.'77 The court summarily acknowledges the power of Con-
gress as providing authority for such a rule.'78
Theory Four-Legislature has Sole Control Over Practice of Law
If Congress can statutorily regulate the practice of law before
administrative agencies, it would seem logical that state legislatures
exercise the same powers within their jurisdictions. However, in
most jurisdictions the power lies with the courts, while in some
other areas the courts and the legislature share the task, often in a
manner determined solely by the courts. In New York, however, the
tables are turned.
Since 1822 the power to regulate and to control the practice of
law has been vested in the legislature, and only by virtue of delega-
tion of power from the legislature can the courts exercise any con-
trol over the field.'79 More importantly, there is no inherent power
in the courts to regulate admission and disbarment of attorneys, nor
is there inherent power to define what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law."80
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id at 604, 53 A.2d at 803.
178. Id.
179. In re Bercu, 69 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 293 App. Div.
524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948), affd mem., 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949).
180. In re Bercu, 69 N.Y.S.2d at 738 (1947), affg In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 11
Abb. Pr. 301 (1860). Cooper set forth the derivation of control over the practice of law
in New York. In the Constitution of 1777, the power of appointing attorneys was
vested in the courts. Id. at 80, 11 Abb. Pr. at 332. Another constitution enacted in 1822
made no mention of the power of courts to appoint attorneys to the bar, and so the
courts have assumed the power impliedly went back to the legislature. Id. Thus, the
19811
Remmert: Representation of Clients Before Administrative Agencies: Authori
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1981
598 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
With the legislature's power in mind, a New York court was
faced with a case in which it had to determine whether it was
unauthorized practice of law for an accountant to research a taxa-
tion question that had been decided by an administrative agency."'
The case, In Re Bercu, involved an accountant who remembered a
decision that he thought would help a particular client, and offered
to find the decision. 8 ' The accountant was charged with illegal prac-
tice of law, but the court held the advice went to a matter of
accounting practice, rather than the practice of law."8
Acknowledging that it'might not be sound public policy to
allow accountants to do this kind of legal research, the court said
the issue was for the legislature, not the courts." If the policy was
to be changed, it was up to the legislature to make the change. At
the appellate level, the court said giving of legal advice would be
tolerated, but the court found that the accountant was practicing
law, because his research was not incidental to accounting.'85 This
holding recognizes that the accountant must know and use tax law
in his or her work, but it also realizes that the boundary between
legal and illegal advice on tax law depends on the context in which
it occurs:
An accountant may know more about tax law than some
law practitioners, just as a labor relations advisor, trust
officer or customs broker may know more about the law
relating to their businesses than many lawyers not
specializing in the law relating to such business. He may
not, however, set himself up as a public consultant on the
law of his specialty. If the services of a specialist in some
particular branchof the law are required, the public must
still turn to the bar ....
The bar then retains its full status as primary source of legal infor-
mation even on specialized questions of law, and yet the lay practi-
legislative power in New York is absolute and unqualified, much like the power of
Parliament in England. Id. at 91, 11 Abb. Pr. at 335. For an interesting journey into
New York legislative history, see Lee, The Courts and Admissions to the Bar, 13
HARV. L. REV. 252 (1899).
181. In re Bercu, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 730 (1947), rev'd on other grounds, 293 App. Div.
524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209 (1948); aff'd mem. 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (1949).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 743.
184. Id.
185. In re Bercu, 273 App. Div. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 276 (1948).
186. Id. at 537, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
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tioner in the tax field or any other field is relieved of the necessity
of seeking the advice of an attorney on a legal question that is merely
incidental to the main work being done by lay specialists.
PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The New York approach to dealing with questions of
unauthorized practice follows most closely the approach used by the
federal government."' 1 This is so because the New York Legislature
delegates power to the courts to deal with unauthorized practice, or
else it simply passes its own regulatory laws much like Congress
does. The courts, then, have the task of interpreting the laws. In no
case do the New York courts exercise broad powers under what is
termed inherent power by many state courts. This approach is com-
parable to the one taken by the federal government.
Administrative Procedure
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 88 a person compelled
to appear before an agency is entitled to be represented by counsel
or other agent. 88 The Administrative Procedure Act is an act of
Congress,'" which allows each agency to decide who may appear
before it in a representative capacity.'8 ' At least part of the reason
for allowing parties to be represented by counsel or qualified layper-
son is to assure adequate protection for the rights of the parties,
especially when the government may be represented in proceedings
by someone appointed because of his or her expertise in a particular
field.8 " Since the government has its experts in the agencies, the
187. See Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Auerbacher
v. Wood, 139 N.J. Eq. 599, 53 A.2d 800 (1947), aff'd, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863
(1948) (agency of federal government acting on authority granted by Congress may
regulate representation of parties before such agency).
188. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)(1966).
189. Id. For the text of this section of the Act, see note 29 supra.
190. The Act first became law in 1946 under 5 U.S.C. § 1005. Section 1005 and
its modern counterpart, § 555(b), are just one segment of the act, which governs the
entire scheme of federal administrative agencies. For in-depth discussions of federal
and state administrative procedure see J. DAVISON & N. GRUDSTEIN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND THE REGULATORY SYSTEM (1966); P. WALL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE INFOR-
MAL PROCESS (1963).
191. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b)(1966).
192. See Waterman, Legislation and Administration, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 261,
262 (1936).
There is authority to the effect that even without an act of Congress, a party to
an administrative proceeding probably has a right to be represented by an agent or at-
torney. See 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 17, 19 (1921). See also Manning v. French, 149 Mass. 391,
21 N.E. 945 (1889).
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parties to an administrative proceeding ought to be allowed
representation by someone at least as skilled as the person
representing the government." If a party does not desire to repre-
sent himself or herself, in some cases that person must choose some-
one from the roster of persons admitted to practice before the par-
ticular agency. '"
The Administrative Procedure Act leaves it to each agency to
decide who may represent clients in its proceedings."' Some agen-
cies, like the United States Patent Office, have stringent re-
quirements for admission to practice,'" while others, like the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, allow anyone chosen by a party to ap-
pear in a representative capacity." The Patent Office, in addition to
stiff admission requirements, has an elaborate disciplinary scheme
for the protection of the public.'"
The requirement of some administrative bars that even licensed
attorneys prove their specific qualifications has been criticized as an
undue burden on lawyers. '" According to a 1953 study, eleven
federal agencies had enrolled bars with formal requirements for ad-
193. See note 192 supra.
194. Practice before federal administrative agencies is governed by the rules
of each agency. Recognition of this principle is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 555(bX1966X"A
person compelled to appear ... is entitled to be accompanied ... by counsel or, if per-
mitted by the agency, by other qualified representative."). The source of this in-
dependence by each agency is found in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which states that
"the parties may plead and manage their own cases personally or by the assistance of
such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage, and conduct causes therein." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1
Stat. 92 (1789) (codified in 28 U.S.C. 394 (1928)).
Some agencies have admission requirements for both attorneys and laypersons
akin to the state bar examinations. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1980) (requirements for
practice before United States Patent Office).
195. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966). Several years before passage of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, there was a growing sentiment among lawyers that prac-
tice before administrative agencies should be limited to attorneys. However, the At-
torney General's Committee, which studied administrative procedure with a view
toward procedural reform, concluded that it doubted "a sweeping interdiction of non-
lawyers would be wise .. " ATT'y GEN. COMM. ON AD. PROC. FINAL REPORT 124 (1941).
196. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1980).
197. 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1980).
198. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.343-1.348 (1980) (Patent Office); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.11
(1980) (Interstate Commerce Commission).
199. See vom Baur, Representation Before Administrative Agencies, 30
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1303 (1955). vom Baur says these requirements serve no useful purpose,
and in addition are an annoying and troublesome burden for attorneys who have
already proven they are qualified as to character and legal skills. Id.
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mission of both attorneys and laypersons.2 °° Attorneys, for example,
who are members of one or more state bars, authorized to appear
before the United States Supreme Court and the federal courts,
could not appear before the Patent Office without becoming a
member of that office's bar."1
Practice Before the United States Patent Office
To ensure that its agents have a full range of qualifications, the
Patent Office has formal requirements for admission to practice." '
From the very beginning, a large number of those who represented
clients were engineers or chemists; they were not lawyers. 2 Pre-
sent rules set down specific guidelines for admission to practice.'
Not only are there strict rules on admission to practice, but it
is illegal to hold oneself out as a patent agent without being duly
qualified by the Patent Office." 5 The regulations for practice, pro-
mulgated by the Patent Office have been upheld in the courts and
strict requirements for admission have been granted great
deference by the courts.2"0 Just as practice before the Patent Office
is stringently controlled, practice before the National Labor Rela-
tions Board is at the other end of the spectrum with few regula-
tions.
200. See F. VOM BAUR, STANDARDS OF ADMISSION TO PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1953).
201. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(a) (1980).
202. It was first authorized to regulate persons who practiced before it in 1861.
Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 8, 12 Stat. 247 (1861). In 1869, the Patent Office regula-
tions provided that "[any person of intelligence and good moral character may appear
as attorney in fact or as an agent of an applicant .... " Rules and Directions for Pro-
ceedings in the Patent Office, § 127 (1869).
203. Letter from Howard S. Rogers, Hearings Before House Comm. on Patents
on H.R. 5527, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1928).
204. 37 C.F.R. § 1.341 (1980). Application must be made on a prescribed form
and proof of good moral character must be submitted in addition to a showing that the
person possesses legal and scientific knowledge for admission to practice. Id. Examina-
tions are given to determine the qualifications of the applicant. Id.
205. 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1952). Once having been admitted to the bar, practitioners
are subject to its disciplinary rules. 37 C.F.R. § 1.344 (1980). A person may be sus-
pended or disbarred from practice for incompetent, disreputable or gross misconduct.
35 U.S.C. § 32 (1952).
206. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (Florida cannot prohibit an
agent registered with the Patent Office from conducting business regarding patents in
Florida); Spector v. Ladd, 296 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (per curiam) (patent agent ex-
cluded from practice for violating rules regarding advertising): Gager v. Ladd, 212 F.
Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1963) (commissioner did not abuse his discretion in holding that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate requisite scientific skills).
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Practice Before the National Labor Relations Board
The National Labor Relations Board traditionally has allowed
anyone, whether a layperson or an attorney, to represent clients in
its hearings.' Congress, in creating the board, provided that the
board would have authority to make such rules as might be
necessary for carrying out the purposes of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 8 The only regulation on appearances applies to former
regional employees of the board, who are prohibited from practicing
in cases pending while the employee worked for the regional
office.2 9 In addition to making no prerequisites for admission to
practice, the board exercises no disciplinary measures regarding
persons who do practice before it, except that the board may ex-
clude a person for contemptuous conduct during a hearing.21
The custom of the National Labor Relations Board, together
with that of the Patent Office, shows both ends of the spectrum on
regulation of administrative appearances, one being very tightly
controlled and the other being very liberal. In both instances, the
choice of whether or not to regulate is left up to the agency in ques-
tion. Powers of regulation are delegated by Congress, and the courts
defer to the congressional mandate and to rules passed pursuant to
it by the agencies. As a result, there is less interference by courts
claiming inherent powers, than there is at the state level.
SOLUTION
The mutifarious holdings of the state courts on unauthorized
practice indicate an area that deserves scrutiny by the courts, as
well as by the state legislatures."' Problems with unauthorized prac-
tice before federal administrative agencies rarely occur" but great
numbers of people daily face uncertainty at the state level as to
whether their activities involve a legal or illegal use of the law. One
way to create a degree of certainty would be to model state ad-
ministrative procedure after the federal system. While it is not a
perfect solution, at least the prospective practitioner before an ad-
207. 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1980). See generally Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134,
138 (D.D.C. 1952). Any person may appear by counsel or other representative. 29
C.F.R. § 102.38 (1980). The rule contains no prerequisites for appearance. Unlike the
Patent Office, the National Labor Relations Board has no enrolled bar. Id.
208. See generally Camp v. Herzog, 104 F. Supp. 134 (D.D.C. 1952).
209. 29 C.F.R. § 102.91 (1978).
210. 29 C.F.R. § 102.44 (1980).
211. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
212. A lack of cases on unauthorized practice seems to prove this point.
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ministrative agency would know what qualifications were required
in advance of being served a summons for a lawsuit. Such a solution
has a solid basis in history.
Federal System Adaptable to State Use
In England, the courts acquired authority to regulate attorneys
through a delegation of power from Parliament. 13 Like its English
ancestor, the federal system takes its cue from Congress in matters
relating to administrative practice.21 ' Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.2"5 Congress has left it to each individual agency to
decide what qualifications are required for practice before the
agency." And the federal courts, all the way up to the Supreme
Court,217 have given great deference to the system and laws set up
by Congress to govern administrative procedure.
On the other hand, the state courts generally do not recognize
any clear-cut guidelines in regulating the practice of law. The four
theories218 discussed previously, indicate the four primary ways in
which the courts view their relationships with state legislatures.
This becomes important when the courts must deal with a law pur-
porting to grant laypersons the right to represent clients in an agency
proceeding. The outcome of an unauthorized practice case is likely
to turn on which theory the court deciding the case picks. If, as in
New York, the courts recognize sole power over practice of law in
the legislature, the court will give great weight to the legislative
act. On the other hand, some courts, under the umbrella of inherent
power, assume all power over the practice of law, ostensibly to
make sure the public is protected.
In federal cases on administrative appearance, generally there
is little discussion of the source of the court's power, for the federal
courts assume that Congress can delegate administrative rulemak-
ing power to the agencies. If states would adopt a similar system,
much of the present uncertainty would be eliminated. The ad-
ministrative agencies could then decide what types of qualifications
213. See note 37 supra.
214. See note 29 supra.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966).
216. The statute states that a person may be represented by counsel or "if per-
mitted by the agency, by other qualified representative" 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1966). Even
before the Administrative Procedure Act, the agencies had power to regulate who ap-
peared before them. See Herman v. Dulles, 205 F.2d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
217. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
218. See notes 95-106 supra and accompanying text.
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are necessary for effective representation, and the requirements for
admission could be as simple as those of the NLRB or as complex as
those of the Patent Office. The public would be protected because
lay practitioners would be subject to the disciplinary rules of the
agency where they practice.
Although the federal system is far from perfect, federal agen-
cies operate without producing the volume of unauthorized practice
litigation that comes from the states. The federal system routinely
allows laypersons to practice before its agencies. And while this
system might seem anathema under some of the rules set down by
state courts, it should be examined carefully before being dismissed
as without merit.
CONCLUSION
A study of unauthorized practice decisions reveals that there is
no uniformity of definition on unauthorized practice. The courts
have added to the problem by disregarding legislative intent with
the result that the prudent lay practitioner dare not rely on state
law for authorization to appear before administrative agencies.
Many courts disregard or strike down state statutes that they feel
might impinge upon inherent judicial powers.
In the federal government, the Administrative Procedure Act
leaves it up to each agency to decide who may represent clients.
Federal courts defer to congressional intent, and laypersons who ap-
pear before federal agencies can depend on agency rules as prece-
dent. Since this is a workable alternative to the confusion that ex-
ists among the states, it would behoove state courts and legislatures
to consider carefully the federal system in revising administrative
law.
Marlene M. Remmert
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